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PILOTS, AIRSPACE COMPLEXITY, AND STRATEGIC CONFLICT AVOIDANCE
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Some future air traffic management concepts seek to place more separation responsibility on the pilot in order to
achieve greater aircraft operating autonomy. Separating one’s own aircraft from others in something other than a
see-and-avoid environment, however, would pose fundamentally new demands and challenges for pilots, and it is
likely that new automation and display tools would be needed. Ideally, an automated strategic conflict avoidance
system would behave consistently with pilot expectations and take pilot interests into account when suggesting
resolution strategies. It might also recognize situations that pilots may have difficulty detecting and resolving on
their own. At this time, little is known about how pilots perceive airspace complexity in self-separation tasks. In this
study, we used a Cockpit Display of Traffic Information (CDTI) with an embedded strategic conflict avoidance aid
to help fourteen commercial transport pilots detect and resolve a series of strategic conflict situations. We then
assessed their performance with and without the aid, recorded and analyzed pilot ratings of aid effectiveness and
usability, and used a neural network model to associate complexity ratings with airspace characteristics to determine
which sets of characteristics most heavily influenced pilot perceptions of airspace complexity. The results of this
analysis provide insight into what aspects of airspace configuration may have the greatest influence on pilot
perceived workload and difficulty understanding conflict situations.
Introduction
Several emerging concepts for future air traffic
management systems seek to transfer some, or all, of
the responsibility for aircraft separation from air
traffic controllers to pilots. In most concepts, such as
the “Free Flight” concept (RTCA, 1995), this is done
to grant airlines and pilots more autonomy, under the
assumption that this will lead to more efficient
routing and allow operators to optimize their routes
or the flow of traffic within their fleets.
For airline and instrument pilots, this will represent a
new set of responsibilities and is likely to add to their
workload. Furthermore, flight management
responsibilities may sometimes make it difficult or
impossible to also attend to self-separation
responsibilities. This suggests that some form of
automated assistance will likely be needed.
In this study, we investigated the usefulness and
usability of a Cockpit Display of Traffic Information
(CDTI) with an embedded automatic strategic
conflict detection capability, coupled with a route
planning aide that assessed the presence of conflicts
associated with modified routes, in a variety of
strategic conflict situations. Recognizing the potential
for mismatches of interests, solutions, and
expectations between the pilot and automation, we
also used a neural network model to better
understand what aspects of the airspace, based on the
positions and trajectories of nearby traffic, most
contributed to pilot perceptions of airspace
complexity.
In particular, the questions we were interested in
included:
• What characteristics of the airspace
(positions and velocities of other aircraft)
affect pilot perceptions of airspace
complexity?
• How  much  benefit  would  a  decision  aid  be
in detecting and resolving conflicts?
• How readily would pilots accept and use
such an aid?
• What characteristics of the airspace affect
the ability of pilots to reliably detect and
resolve conflict situations without help?
• How much complexity can pilots reliably
handle before decision making and route
replanning performance start to deteriorate?
The results of this study should help guide the
development of automated route planning and
conflict resolution aids and ensure that such aids
adequately account for pilot interests and
expectations. It should also help guide the
development of airspace management procedures
involving aircraft with self-separation capabilities.
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Method
This study brought two bodies of prior work together
to  support  the  effort:  a  CDTI  developed  at  NASA,
and prior work using neural networks to understand
how air traffic controllers are influenced by airspace
complexity factors.
CDTI
We used a CDTI/route planning aid (hereafter
referred to simply as the “aid”) that was already
under development at NASA (Johnson, Battiste,
Delzell, Holland, Belcher, & Jordan, 1997). The
display, shown in Figure 1, depicts own aircraft
position at the lower center of the display and nearby
traffic represented as chevron symbols. These
symbols are green when the other aircraft are below
own-ship, white when at the same altitude, and blue
when above. When the system detects a conflict,
ownship and the conflicting aircraft turn amber, an
amber connecting line is drawn to show the projected
conflict position, and an audible alert is given. In
addition, aircraft that may come close to own-ship
but do not currently conflict are shown in amber
outline without an alert to help the crew monitor
traffic that might merit special attention.
Figure 1. CDTI showing a projected conflict
In addition to displaying relative traffic positions and
conflict status, the aid can also display aircraft
information and flight plan intentions. The user can
also select a pulse display feature in which the
positions of aircraft along their vectors are projected
into the future. This allows the user to compare the
relative positions of aircraft into the future, and
determine  what  the  order  of  aircraft  arrival  at  a
crossing point would be.
The CDTI also includes a real-time route planning
module that allows the pilot to adjust the path while
receiving real-time feedback about whether the
adjusted path would be free of conflicts. The pilot
can  “grab”  the  path  with  a  cursor  and  move  it  in
either direction, or place a waypoint on the path and
assign an altitude change to the waypoint. This
capability made the CDTI a good platform for
performing the experiment manipulations required
for this study.
Airspace Complexity Factors
A number of prior studies (Chatterji & Sridhar, 2001;
Kopardekar & Magyarits, 2002; Kopardekar, 1997;
Mogford, Guttman, Morrow, & Kopardekar, 1995)
have examined the effect of airspace complexity
factors on air traffic controller perceptions of airspace
complexity. Various sets of factors have been
introduced by a variety of authors, but they usually
include parameters associated with the number of
aircraft in an area, the number of aircraft within an
altitude band, the number of aircraft changing
trajectory either laterally or vertically, the presence or
absence of conflict conditions, the angle of
convergence in a conflict, and others. The number of
these measures suggested by various authors jumped
after the RTCA free-flight concept (RTCA, 1995)
because this concept included a notion of “dynamic
density” characterized by airspace complexity
factors; a given airspace would be under either free-
maneuvering rules or positive control depending on
its dynamic density.
We surveyed the collection of airspace complexity
factor lists that had been compiled, eliminated those
factors that could only relate to ground-based control
(and therefore were not relevant to self-separation),
and then eliminated factors that were essentially
identical to arrive at a list of potentially relevant and
unique factors. We then collected these factors into
21 sets for use with the neural network.
Experiment
Fourteen commercial pilots, all male and all with
glass cockpit experience, participated in the
experiment, which was performed on a laptop
computer. The pilots were asked to resolve fourteen
conflict situations, which had been designed to cover
a range of difficulty levels from very low to very
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high, and to include a variety of conflict types (two
vs. multiple aircraft involved, head-on conflicts vs.
shallow-angle conflicts, and conflicts with aircraft
that  were  changing  altitude  to  or  through  own
altitude). Prior to performing in the experiment trials,
the pilots were given a short training presentation
about the nature and procedure of the study, filled out
demographic questionnaires, and completed six
training trials.
Each trial began with the traffic configuration
appearing, detected conflicts shown, and the display
freezing so the pilot could study the situation. A
rating box was displayed so the pilot could rate the
complexity of the situation on a three point scale. The
pilot could examine the flight and flight plan
information for any aircraft on the display, and did
not need to enter the complexity rating until fully
understanding the situation. We measured the time
from scenario start until the pilot entered the
complexity rating in hopes that this time measure
could serve as an objective measure of complexity
(under the theory that it would take more time to
understand a more complex situation). As it turned
out, there was no significant correlation between the
time required to enter the complexity ratings and the
ratings themselves.
After the pilot entered the complexity rating for a
given scenario, the display would resume motion and
the pilot would have the opportunity to adjust the
route to resolve conflicts. In half of the experiment
trials (counterbalanced for scenario and order), the
pilot would be provided with real-time feedback from
the aid about whether the adjusted route had resolved
the initial conflicts and whether it had created any
new  ones.  In  the  other  half,  this  feedback  was  not
given; the initial conflict continued to be depicted
and  the  pilots  were  asked  to  judge  on  their  own
whether the adjusted route was conflict-free.
When the pilot was satisfied that the adjusted route
was free of conflicts, he would enter the route into
the  system,  which  would  then  provide  feedback that
the new route had been activated. Then, another
rating box was displayed, this one asking the pilot to
rate the difficulty of resolving the situation on a five
point  scale.  Once  this  rating  was  provided,  the
experiment would move on to the next trial (or end).
After completing the experiment trials, the pilots
filled out a survey covering their attitudes regarding
the usefulness and usability of the aid. The pilots
were paid $100 for their participation.
Analysis
The list of measures included:
• the complexity ratings
• the time required to enter these ratings
• airspace configuration at the time of these
ratings
• the difficulty ratings
• total completion time for each trial
• whether any conflicts remained at the end of
each trial
• pilot ratings of aid usefulness and usability.
We tested the effects of the aid on complexity and
difficulty ratings using repeated-measures regression
analyses as well as tests of differences in regression
coefficients. Repeated-measures Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA) methods were used to determine the effects
of the aid on the accuracy and total time of resolving
conflicts. Finally, we evaluated the pilot ratings (on a
seven point scale) of aid acceptability by inspection.
The neural network analysis was more involved. As
mentioned earlier, the airspace characteristics, as
represented in terms of the selected complexity
measures, were recorded at the time of the entered
complexity ratings. This allowed us to associate the
complexity measures with the subjective complexity
ratings. We then trained a neural network to
reproduce the aggregate complexity ratings through
an iterative feedback process, as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: The neural network used iterative back
propagation to “learn” how to produce complexity
ratings representative of the pilot ratings
Through this iterative back propagation process, in
which the network attempted to reproduce the
aggregate pilot complexity ratings with each of the
21  sets  of  complexity  factors,  we  were  able  to
determine which sets of factors produced the best
match between pilot ratings and the neural network
outputs. In other words, we determined which set of
factors caused the network’s behavior to most closely
match that of the pilots.
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Results
In summary, the results demonstrated that the aid
improved pilot avoidance of conflicts and was generally
accepted and liked by the pilots. We were also able to
identify a set of eleven airspace complexity components
out of the original 21 that appear to most heavily
influence pilot complexity ratings.
One of the most informative pilot performance results
had to do with the comparison of the complexity and
difficulty ratings for each scenario. This is because of
the possibility that the aid might be able to make
complex situations relatively easy to resolve. To
facilitate this comparison, we used a three point scale
for complexity ratings and a five point scale for
difficulty ratings to discourage subjects from merely
repeating their complexity ratings, given at the start of
the scenario, in the difficulty ratings given at the end.
The reason for suspecting that the aid might make
complex situations easy to resolve had to do with
how  the  aid  transformed  the  nature  of  the  task.
Without the aid, the pilot had to mentally visualize
how the airspace situation would change over time.
With the aid, the pilot had to merely adjust the route
until  none  of  the  aircraft  symbols  and  vectors  were
yellow. This transformed the task from a complex,
multidimensional visualization involving multiple
targets to a simple binary judgment.
Indeed, we found that the correlation between these
two ratings dropped significantly when using the aid,
from r = 0.76 with the aid off (in the trials where no
assistance was provided during route adjustment) to
0.62 with the aid on (two-tailed alpha = .05). This
demonstrated that the aid effectively decoupled the
difficulty of resolving the scenario from the
conceptual complexity of the scenario.
 We also found that subjects who resolved conflicts
first using the aid rated the overall complexity of all
scenarios as more complex than those who resolved
conflicts  first  without  the  aid  (F(1,  12)  =  5.00,  p  <
.05). This suggested that using the aid informed the
subjects about the true complexity of scenarios,
perhaps by showing them conflicts that they would
not have otherwise noticed. This may have caused
them to better appreciate the complexity of scenarios
they later attempted to solve without the aid.
As expected, subjects resolved conflicts more
accurately when using the aid (88% resolved) than
they did without the aid (77% resolved). (With one
statistical outlier removed, these figures were 90%
and 76% respectively.) However, it took pilots longer
to resolve conflicts when using the aid. This may
reflect the absence of feedback when attempting to
resolve conflicts without the aid; without information
that the adjusted route was conflict-free, subjects may
have entered the new route more quickly than they
would have with feedback that there were still
conflicts present.
We  used  a  seven  point  scale  to  measure  pilot
opinions about the aid’s usefulness and usability. In
general, pilots gave the aid favorable ratings for both.
They indicated that they would like to use the aid in a
free-flight environment, but they expressed concern
about the proposed changing roles of air traffic
controllers and pilots; several of the subjects
commented that they would prefer to retain positive
ground  control,  but  that  if  they  had  to  operate  in  a
free-flight environment, they would value the
assistance of the proposed aid. They also indicated
that they were not confident resolving conflicts
without the aid (nine subjects expressed lower than
neutral confidence, three higher than neutral, and
two neutral).
In order to learn how to approximate the pilots’
complexity ratings, the neural network had to be
given an aggregate set of ratings (low, medium, high)
that represented the “consensus” rating of the group.
To do this, we calculated, for each scenario, a
weighted average rating with a floor function to
match the weighted average to the rating scale.
Taking this weighted average as the aggregate rating
for each scenario, we were able to assess the
representativeness of the aggregate ratings by
calculating the proportion of pilots whose ratings
agreed with the aggregate, for the three levels of
rating. This is shown in Table 1.
Pilot Ratings
Aggregate Low Medium High
Low 69.6% 28.6% 1.8%
Medium 30.5% 62.8% 6.7%
High 7.2% 35.7% 57.1%
Table 1. The proportion of pilots whose ratings
agreed with the aggregate ratings
We then used this aggregate rating set as the criterion
to be approximated by the neural network through the
back propagation process. In general, the network
solution stabilized after about a thousand iterations.
The proportion of neural network ratings that
matched the pilot ratings is shown in Table 2.
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Neural Network
Pilot Low Medium High
Low 68.3% 30.8% 0.9%
Medium 14.4% 81.7% 3.9%
High 0% 43.5% 56.5%
Table 2. The proportion of neural network ratings
that agreed with the aggregate pilot ratings
Table 2 shows that the neural network did a very
good job of emulating the pilot ratings. With the
neural network trained to behave approximately as
the pilots did, we examined how well it performed
with the various sets of airspace complexity
components, reasoning that the set of components
that gave the best match between the neural network
and pilot ratings would best represent the set of
influences on the pilot’s own perceptions.
Several sets of components scored relatively well,
differing in how well they matched either the high or
low ends of the scale (that is, some sets closely
matched the low complexity ratings but did less well
on the high, while others did the reverse). One set
that showed the best balance across the scale and
contained a relatively sparse number of components
included the following components:
• the total number of aircraft in the scenario
• the number of climbing, cruising, and
descending aircraft
• measures of horizontal and vertical
proximity
• amount of time remaining before conflict
• the ratio of the standard deviation of speed
to  the  average  speed  of  aircraft  in  the
scenario
• the number of unique alerts ongoing
• the presence or absence of an alerting state
• the presence of shallow angle conflicts
(which are particularly difficult for pilots to
recognize and project).
For this set of components, the neural network
matched the pilots’ aggregate “low” rating 68.3% of
the time, the “medium” rating 81% of the time, and
the “high” rating 52.2% of the time.
Conclusions
These results provide an initial step toward
understanding how pilots conceptualize the local
airspace in strategic conflict situations, and may help
us better understand what capabilities and behaviors
they will expect and need in a strategic conflict
avoidance aid for a free-maneuvering environment.
Ideally, these and the results of following studies will
help designers compensate for known pilot
performance weaknesses in such situations (such as
poor ability to recognize shallow angle conflicts and
to visualize conflicts involving aircraft with changing
altitudes). They should also ensure that future self-
separation aids take pilot interests and expectations
into account, thus avoiding potentially surprising
behaviors in potentially dangerous situations.
In the next steps for this work, we hope to add real-
world maneuvering constraints such as weather and
restricted airspace, and introduce traffic with changing
flight plans, dynamic maneuvering, and possibly
unreliable intent information. We would also like to
compare pilot solutions to such conflicts with optimum
solutions to better understand pilot strengths and
weaknesses in such circumstances, determine at what
levels of complexity pilot performance breaks down
(and automation is required), and how pilots can
effectively manage failures of the conflict aid in
complex traffic environments. We hope that these
results will inform not only future technology
development in this area, but also the development of
airspace management and flight deck procedures in
free-maneuvering environments.
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